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We draw some lessons from the Tunisian experience of social reforms and associated unrest. Our main interest is 
the  riots  that  occurred  after  subsidy  cuts  and  the  attempts  at  substitution  of  price  subsidies  by  direct  cash 
transfers. We propose new welfare indicators to assess reforms in such situations. Using micro level data, we 
show that plausible policy decisions depend on parameters describing the balance between poverty and program 
exclusion risk. In the Tunisian case, only a much larger weight put on poverty relatively to exclusion could bring 
the decision maker to substitute in force price subsidies with direct cash transfers.  
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One of the three key challenges identified by the World Bank in meeting the goals of 
the 10
th Economic Development Plan is to strengthen the performance of social programs 
while maintaining budget balances (The World Bank, 2004). However, the implementation of 
this objective often meets difficulties in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) because social 
programs that are seen as more efficient by governments and international organizations raise 
severe  risks  for  some  of  the  poor.  This  situation  has  often  led  to  social  unrest.  Then, 
progressive and efficient social policies may be the source of social and political conflicts, a 
serious concern for politically fragile states. 
In Muslim states of Middle-East or North Africa, such fears combine with the threat of 
integrist Islamic terrorism to make unpopular reform especially sensitive. On the other hand, 
it has often been recognized that fighting terrorism cannot be done only by military means, 
but that some social justice should be provided so as to protect the poorest populations against 
distressing situations, and thereby avoid them to search refuges in extreme ideologies. In that 
sense, the design of social policies in this context is intimately related to the control of social 
and political violence. 
In order to reach the dual political objectives of reforming policies while limiting civil 
conflict, one needs to avail of social welfare indicators accounting for the risk of violent 
conflict. These indicators should account for the fact that reducing vulnerability not only 
implies to reduce poverty but also to limit the policy-induced risk for the non-poor of falling 
in poverty and the risk for the poor to become still poorer. 
Our  leading  case  corresponds  to  subsidy  cuts  in  developing  countries,  where  they 
often yielded violent conflict. Indeed, protests against subsidy cuts are recurrent in LDCs as 




84. Other ‘price riots’ recently broke out at the end of the 1990s and in the beginning of the 
2000s, in countries as diverse as: Indonesia in 1998 and 2005, Nigeria in 2003, Yemen and 
Mexico in 2005, Malaysia, India and Sudan in 2006, South Korea in 2007, Cameroun and 
Egypt in 2008.
1 
These violent outbursts have typical features. Almost always, the price  hikes were 
large, discrete and well above  the inflation rate. There was no evidence of an articulated 
agenda among rioters, or of leadership organizing the riots. The cause of the riots is rather to 
be searched in the perception  by the population  that the government are  being reneging on 
past commitment to low prices.  Riots start in town as u rban dwellers cannot retreat from 
markets, whereas peasants can switch to growing food.  
It is not our ambition in this paper to offer definitive solutions to such  a complex 
economic, social and political issue as the question of subsidy cuts is. We shall limit ourselves 
to  reflecting  on  the  Tunisian  case   and  proposing  new  policy-monitoring  indicators 
incorporating potential poverty risks affecting the poor during economic reforms. 
In Section 2, we discuss the anti -poverty policies  and social issues  in Tunisia.  In 
Section 3, we propose an analytical framework. Section 4 presents  our estimation results. 









                                                            
1 See for references on this violent incidents: Al Jazeera, July 22, 2005; International Herald Tribune, March 20, 
2005; People’s Daily, September 30, 2005; BBC News, June 26, 2003, February 29, 2008 and March 12, 2008; 
Berita Informasi, October 13, 2006; Reuters, July 9, 2006; The Hindu, January 8, 2006; New York Times, 






2. Anti-Poverty Policies and Social Issues in Tunisia 
 
2.1. Poverty and social policies in Tunisia 
 
The periods we deal with are primarily the 1980s till 1990 that is the year of the micro 
level  data  we  use  in  our  estimation.  However,  we  also  discuss  the  present  situation  in 
Tunisia.
2 
The successive governments put the social constraint in the centre of their priorities, 
and implemented vigorous social policies. In the 1980s, poverty was already lower in Tunisia 
than in  the other countries of the region. Many formal social protection mechanisms  were 
already present at that time. Public expenditure on health and education was on the increase. 
Infrastructures were improving and expending. The growing role of the state generated more 
government jobs. In particular, the poor who were able to work were assisted through public 
work and micro-credit for self-employment. Insurance against old age was provided through 
expanded pension schemes. Also private remittances from abroad, which amounted to over 
four percent of GDP, helped alleviate household hardships. Last, but not least, food subsidies 
on basic necessities and cash assistance helped those who could not afford basic needs. 
In the 1990s, the growth in the country revenues was on the decline. This curtailed the 
ability of the state to help the poor, while demographic growth created more needs. The mean 
real GDP growth rate was 5.8 percent in 1976-85, and fell to 3.0 percent in 1986-90, and 3.9 
percent in 1991-95, before to rise again to 5.2 percent in 1996-98. Unemployment started to 
rise along with the vulnerability of the poor, although poverty was dropping. Despite of this, 
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real  wages  seem  to  have  remained  unchanged  between  1983  and  1993.  In  1995,  the 
unemployment rate was about 15 percent (11 percent in urban areas); although it is widely 
believed that the actual numbers much exceed these statistics.  
 
2.2. The social sectors 
 
The current Tunisian social conditions are more favourable than in other countries of 
the region in most sectors: life expectancy (70 years for female and 68 years for males); birth 
control (the birth rate fell from 45.1 per mil in 1966 to 17.9 per mil in 1998); education 
(alphabetisation  rate  of  55  percent  for  females  and  79  percent  for  males);  female  status 
(abolition of polygamy and repudiation); wage policy (triennial agreement about wage rises 
between unions and firms) and basic needs (access to water, electricity and housing). 
The  Tunisia  family  planning  association  was  founded  in  1968.  It  promoted  a 
diminution of the fertility of Tunisian women. In particular, family benefits were limited to 
the first three children. The total fertility rate dropped from 6.4 children per woman in 1970 
down to 2.8 children per woman in 1996. 
In Tunisia, basic education is provided free of charge. Enrolment rates are almost 
identical for girls and boys. However, if secondary enrolment is as high as 78 percent in 
Tunis, it only reaches 19 percent in rural  governorates. The public education budget  was 
stable over the 1990s at 6 percent of GDP in 1990 and 6.5 percent in 1995. 
Public works help providing employment to the poor. These programs create short-
term jobs for unskilled workers. Participants are primarily from agriculture (66 percent) and 
construction (28 percent). During 1987-91, the programs employed on average 7500 workers 




On the whole in 1990, the government spent about 20 percent of its budget on social 
transfers including subsidies, spending on education, public health, social insurance, regional 
development, employment and training schemes, program for youth, social housing schemes 
and direct assistance to the poor. In 1995 after a big reform, the social sector expenditure still 
amounted to 10.5 percent of public budget. The main expenditure posts were: education (6.5 
percent) and public pensions (2.6 percent) followed by health (2.2 percent) and food subsidies 
(1.7 percent). Finally, social assistance including cash and in kind transfers amounted to 1 
percent of GDP and public works only to 0.4 percent. 
 
2.3. The food subsidies 
 
The Tunisian consumption of basic food stuffs  has  been subsidized by the Caisse 
Générale de Compensation since the 1970s. The principal policy against poverty in Tunisia for 
many  decades  has  been  the  Tunisian  Universal  Food  Subsidies  Program  (TUFSP).  The 
consumer  food  subsidies  aimed  at  stabilizing  prices  of  basic  food  staples,  protect  the 
purchasing power of the poor, redistribute income to the poor and improve their nutritional 
status.  They  are  implemented  through  multiple  public  interventions  along  the  marketing 
chain, from importers through refiners, up to distributors.  
The subsidies have an important nutritional impact as in 1990 about sixty percent of 
caloric intake and half of protein consumption came from subsidized food, although the poor 
often remained under recommended intake levels. 
However, this program is extremely costly and very inefficient. In 1984 the subsidies 
cost 4.1 percent of GDP (3.3 percent in 1981) and 10 percent of government expenditure. 
Furthermore, the poor received in total much less from the program than the better off 




of  subsidised  products  was  put  in  place  to  discourage  the  non-poor  to  participate  in  the 
benefits. After the reform, the program cost was reduced in 1990 to 2.9 percent of GDP, and 
in 1993 to 1.9 percent. It is still large.  
One issue is still that much of the subsidy money goes to the non-poor. The 1993 
Tunisia absolute incidence of food subsidies by increasing quintiles of per capita consumption 
is: 21% for the poorest quintile, then 20%, 21%, 20% respectively for the second, third and 
fourth quintiles and 18% for the richest quintile (Razmara, 1998). 
 
2.4. The cash transfers 
 
An alternative to price subsidies are the direct cash transfers to the poor.  The  most 
important cash transfer program in Tunisia is the “Programme des Familles Nécessiteuses”, 
administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The program transfers cash to the elderly and 
the handicapped.  
It started in 1986 with 65,000 families (85% of the target population). In 1994, it 
reached 107,000 families (72%). In 1990 about 100,000 needy families received TD 56 per 
family per quarter, which was equivalent to TD 34 per capita per year. In 1990, this program 
reached about 500,000 people. This is to be compared to the price subsidy scheme, which 
affects the whole population. 
The program administration is complex, which causes inefficiencies. Because of the 
difficulties in observing individual incomes, cash transfers in Tunisia are characterised by a 
large leakage of the benefits to the non-poor. Moreover, many poor are not reached by the 
program. The eligibility criteria are very general and entitlement to benefits is not always 
fully defined. Eligibility lists are rarely updated. Even when the lists are updated coverage is 




through the present screening process. The undercoverage (the proportion of the poor not 
reached) of this scheme is blatant, with at least 40,000 families on waiting lists. Geographical 
coverage  also  seems  inadequate.  Finally,  financial  constraints  have  prevented  sufficient 
transfers to lift the needy families above their  subsistence threshold. Finally, it would be 
useful to extend the transfers to those facing a risk of falling into poverty. 
Meanwhile, 23 percent  of the covered families  receive support from  various other 
programs, while about 4 percent were covered by the social insurance system and should 
therefore not have been eligible for the Programme des Familles Nécessiteuses. In particular, 
they  are  several  in-kind  transfer  programs,  which  are  publicly  administered:  food  aid  to 
children  conditionally  on  attendance  to  schools;  nutritional  programs  for  mothers  and 
children; financial aid to elderly and handicapped. 
One  can  improve  targeting  of  cash  transfers  by  anchoring  them  on  observable 
characteristics correlated with living standards. This approach is called ‘proxy-means testing’. 
The transfers based on proxy-means tests are calculated using predictions of household living 
standards. Using household living standard survey data, one first regresses the living standard 
variable on household characteristics easy to observe. The predicted living standards for out-
of-sample households are a linear score of their observable characteristics, weighed by the 
estimated coefficients obtained from the regression.  
 
2.5. The first reform attempt 
 
At the end of December 1983, the government, facing the financial unsustainability of 
the subsidy program, suddenly raised the prices of cereal products twofold. This rise, the first 




made to the public only one day before the price hikes. Detailed information on the reform is 
available in The World Bank (1996).  
The population reacted with violence in the South, notably the South West, one of the 
poorest regions, mostly covered by deserts. Riots started in Douz, Kebili, El Hamma, and 
followed north to Gafsa, Kasserine, Sfax and Tunis. They were much concentrated in the 
poorest neighbourhoods. 
By reducing the number of recipients, targeting could diminish the political support 
for taxation and redistribution (Donder and Hindricks, 1998, Pritchett, 2005). Indeed, some 
non-poor households in Tunisia may lose from modernizing public assistance to the poor. The 
large leakage of the assistance systems may cause negative political incentives among the 
beneficiaries from the leaked funds.  However, in Tunisia most of the protesters were poor 
and disinherited. Many were young and even young teenagers. The occupation categories 
most participating in these riots were the seasonal workers, the peasants, the shopkeepers and 
the unemployed. Students sided with the poor, and schools and universities went on strike. In 
the whole country, poor rural and urban neighbourhoods were affected. The latter suggests 
that on the whole the protest can be interpreted as a genuine revolt of the poor.  
The  government  responded  by  announcing  compensations  through  wage  rises  and 
benefit hikes of TD 1.5 per month per person.  However, only  formally employed people 
could benefit from these compensatory measures, and therefore the bulk of the poor were 
excluded. Even if the trade unions were appeased, the students and the poor erupted in mass 
violence, causing about eighty casualties. Finally, President Bourghiba called off the subsidy 
cuts after one week, taking the defence of the poor. This was the first public recognition of a 
specific political role of the poor in Tunisia. 
The violent response of the poor to the cancelation of subsidies should not have come 




transfers alleviate poverty, but also exclude many poor and many households just above the 
poverty line. The poverty risk generated by the subsidy cuts was correctly understood by the 
poor  and  near  poor.  However,  the  perception  of  targeting  risk  by  poor  households  may 
hamper the development of efficient anti-poverty cash transfers. 
Tunisia is not an isolated case. For example, similar events took place in Egypt during 
the 1970s (Ahmed and Bouis, 2002, Ahmed, Bouis, Gutner and Löfgren, 2001, Gutner, 2002). 
In 1973, world wheat prices were multiplied by more than four, raising the cost of Egypt’s 
wheat imports. The government expenditure on food subsidies had to rise in parallel up to 14 
percent  of  total  government  expenditure.  In  January  1977,  after  negotiating  with  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  in  1976,  the  government  announced  price  hikes  for  some 
subsidized products (bread, flour, sugar, rice, tea, butane gas, gasoline and cigarettes). The 
subsidy cuts prompted violent riots. Rioters saw the cuts as government reneging on promises 
of ‘greater prosperity for everyone’ and that subsidies would not been affected by reforms. 
Riots erupted in Cairo and Alexandria, and then spread to other places in the Nile Valley. 
Violence stopped only when the government rescinded the subsidy cuts after a few days. 
Later on, the subsidies were even extended as a response to the rioters’ demand for social 
equity. 
Besides, as mentioned in the introduction, many ‘price riots’ are still taking place all 
over the world. 
 
2.6. The second reform attempt 
 
Let us return to the Tunisian subsidies reform to show how exclusion and targeting 
concerns, not just poverty reduction, are crucial for policy designs. The reform package was 




1991. The reform of the subsidy program was carried out in such a way to develop ‘self-
targeting’ by emphasizing subsidies on basic foodstuff (Alderman and Lindert, 1998). The 
reform, moving away from direct cash transfers, avoided the exclusion of the poor or the 
unemployed from the program, while it improved the targeting performance towards the poor.  
The decision not  to  pursue direct  cash  transfers may have been  influenced by the 
difficult administration of a composite program of subsidies and cash transfers. Managing 
eligibility lists can be expensive to maintain. Political and social interference may degrade the 
integrity of these lists (Park et al., 2002). However, decentralizing administrative tasks could 
enhance transfer efficiency as in Bangladesh (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005).  
As Lindert (2000) explains, the Tunisian reform was a practical attempt to improve the 
cost efficiency and targeting of a universal safety net program. She signals that subsidies 
before the reform already contributed five times more to the purchasing power of the poor 
than to that of the rich. Conventional targeting approaches rely on means-testing or other 
individual assessment to screen eligible households. Improvement of self-targeting subsidies 
in Tunisia was based on low quality products so as to discourage higher income groups from 
participating. Before the reform, 8 percent of food subsidies reached the poor in 1985, then 17 
percent in 1990, and 21 percent after the reform in 1993 (Alderman and Lindert, 1998). 
By mid 1980s the subsidy program represented 4 percent of GDP and the costs were 
rising by over 8 percent per annum in real terms. After the reform, the cost of subsidies was 
reduced to about 2 percent of GDP and to less than 6 percent of government expenditure. So, 
partial success was achieved. 
Policy  makers  in  Tunisia  have  learned  how  to  prepare  the  price  hikes  months  in 
advance.  Communication  about  price  subsidies  and  the  reasons  of  policy  changes  much 
improved over time. In 1989, an ‘awareness campaign’ preceded the price hikes. The heavy 




newspapers, all closely controlled by the government. Even the President mentioned the issue 
in  public  speeches.  Price  hike  announcements  took  place  several  months  in  advance.  A 
similar effort of public explanation of the benefits of direct transfers would still be useful.  
Sri Lanka in the 1950s and the 1960s is an example were the subsidy cuts went well 
(Bienen  and  Gersowitz,  1986),  in  part  because  public  opinion  was  prepared  for  reform. 
Specific communication strategies were used for introducing the reform. The reasons for the 
subsidy cuts were explained to the population. Small farmers were mobilized in favor of the 
program. There was discipline inside the government. External donors were quick to respond. 
Only a few prices were raised and the minimum wage was increased too.  
In Tunisia, compensating measures were announced simultaneously to  price hikes: 
allowances for beneficiaries of direct assistance programs,  increasing direct aid of school 
cafeterias,  raises  in  minimum  wages.  It  was  understood  it  was  necessary  to  provide  a 
convincing  and  public  rationale  for  reforms  and  to  organize  pilot  experiments  in  local 
contexts.  In  particular,  the  savings  obtained  were  emphasized  while  the  poor  remaining 
protected. 
After the 1984 riots all price hikes have been gradual and moderate. Also, the prices of 
different staple goods were raised at different times. The government implemented the price 
hikes  during  the  summer,  when  the  students  were  absent  from  school,  and  not  likely  to 
demonstrate. 
 
2.7. The current situation 
 
Additional social progress have been made recently in Tunisia, even if strengthening 




(The World Bank, 2004). Life expectancy has reached 72 years; poverty has dropped from 8 
percent of the population in 1995 to 4 percent in 2000.  
However, the social and political situation is becoming volatile again. In April 2000, 
the first popular protest since 1984 broke out when taxi and truck drivers laid over for three 
days in Tunis against new driving licences opening increased opportunities to policemen to 
intimidate  drivers  (Smith,  2000).  Then,  the  drivers’  strike  was  followed  by  student 
demonstrations, which were supported by young unemployed workers and by other sections 
of the population. The demonstrations extended to the suburbs of the big towns and many 
small towns.
3 
The unrest is associated with tricky circumstances for families. Because of the recent 
price  rises  for  gas,  electricity,  water  and  transports,  many  households  have  increasing 
difficulties to make ends meet and face debts. Unemployment is on the increase , 15 percent 
officially,  while  probably  much  more  in  reality.   This  potentially  explosi ve  context  is 
reinforced by the loss in credibility and legitimacy of the Tunisian  State (Hibou, 1999a, b). 
Ministries and administrations are  seen as  controlled by different clans. Privatisations and 
State  criminalization hamper the  traditional  bargaining mechanisms,  the  conditions of the 
Tunisians’ submission. 
Moreover, public freedom of expression is scarce in Tunisia. Many Tunisians are in 
jail for minor political acts of opposition, such as internet navigation (Labidi, 2006). This 
leaves violent demonstrations as the only channel for protest.  
What about poverty alleviation policies in this situation? New financial resources must 
be found in order to placate the growing demands of the population. In these conditions, 
subsidies look again like too expensive. How to improve policy efficiency and save funds, 
while  still  protecting  the  poor?  Policy  makers  must  take  heed  of  the  trade-off  between 
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reducing budgetary costs and protecting the poor, while preserving political stability. For this 
they need statistical indicators. 
  In the next section, we move from these policy considerations to the precise definition of 
indicators with which policies and social situations can be assessed. We start with the definition 
of the poverty measures and how they are calculated given a specific policy. 
 
 
3. An Analytical Framework 
 
3.1. Post-policy poverty Assessment 
 
Our poverty estimators are based on the popular FGT poverty measures (Foster et al., 






y z where z is a pre-specified poverty line, f(.) is the c.d.f. of 
household income y (or household living standard) and   is a poverty aversion parameter. The 
objective function can be weighed by equivalent-scales in each household and the income 
function can be replaced by income per-adult-equivalent to deal with poverty at the individual 
level rather than the household level. However, for expositional simplicity, we forget for the 
moment that households may include several members. One could extend our approach to 
other poverty measures.  
Let us first consider the policy of direct cash transfers. Given a transfer budget, one 
must  choose  transfers  that  optimally  allocate  this  budget  across  households.  The  optimal 
transfer allocation is  the solution to post-transfer poverty minimization subject  to  a fixed 
transfer budget, and using only non-negative transfers. We obtain t




to household i, which depends on y
i is pre-transfer income, B is the budget to allocate and z 
the poverty line. Meanwhile, we do not considered how the fixed budget B is funded.  
In  practice,  living  standards  are  imperfectly  observed  for  most  households.  What 
proxy-means tests try to do is to assess household living standards and identify the poor. In 
the previous optimisation program, the incomes yi must be replaced by their predictions, p_yi 
= Xi β, obtained from regressing yi (or a transformation of it) on a set of explanatory variables 
Xi easy to observe. These regressions employed for the proxy-means tests are carried out 
using data from a living standard household survey. β is the vector of estimated coefficients 
obtained from the regression. The corresponding true value in the population is denoted β0. 
The poor are therefore identified by the inequality Xi β < z, where z is the poverty line. 
Once  the  predictions  Xiβ  are  calculated,  they  can  be  introduced  in  the  previous 
optimisation program in place of the yi. Then, the transfers t
*
i for each household i can be 
calculated  as  the  solution  to  this  optimisation  problem.  Finally,  the  post-transfer  poverty 
measures, based on the yi + t
*
i can be estimated in order to assess post-policy poverty. 
Let us now consider the subsidies program. The equivalent gain of the food subsidy 
program is calculated in a form similar to a transfer vector:  , ) , , ( Y Y p p Y
s r
e  where Y is 
the income vector for observed households, Ye(.) is the equivalent-income function vector for 
observed households, p
r is the reference price vector composed of the prices obtained without 
food subsidies, p
s is the price vector under food subsidies, and   is the vector of the estimated 
equivalent-transfers under food subsidies. The equivalent-income function, and therefore , is 
obtained by estimating a demand system using household survey data. 
The poverty measure under price subsidies is calculated by converting the incomes 
and the poverty line into their equivalent values based on the reference price vector p
r instead 
of the observed price vector p




Finally,  administrative  costs  of  a  transfer  program,  typically  a  few  percent  of  the 
global  budget,  should  be  taken  into  account.  However,  Caldés  et  al.  (2006)  show  the 
complexity of assessing administrative costs. 
 
3.2. Introducing targeting risk 
 
We are interested in post-program poverty shocks which have been seen associated to 
riots. The post-program poverty reduction is ˆ ( , ) ( , ) , z Y z Y T  where T ˆ  is the 
vector of the estimated household transfers. 
Imperfect  targeting  can  be  described similarly  to the  two  usual types  of  statistical 
errors. The Type I error (undercoverage) is that of not implementing transfers for some of the 
poor.  The Type II error corresponds to transfers awarded to some ineligible non-poor people. 
In this typical vocabulary, akin to what is used in statistical theory, the null hypothesis would 
correspond to poverty for an individual, and would condition the decision to provide him with 
cash transfer. The undercoverage statistics provides a simple way of describing the risk for a 
poor household not to be reached by the policy. The undercoverage rate (UR) is  
UR1 = ((1/N) 
N











. That is: UR1 is, among households who are poor, the proportion of 
households  not  identified  as  poor  by  using  their  predicted  income  deduced  from  their 
observable characteristics. The definition of UR1 must be adjusted when the transfer budget is 
not large enough to serve all the households identified as poor. In that case, the transfers t(Xi) 
> 0 correspond to a subset of the observations with Xβ < z, and  
UR2 = ( (1/N) 
N




That is: UR2 is, among households who are poor, the proportion of households who do 
not receive any transfer. In these cases, UR2 are superior or equal to UR1 since there may be 
poor households who are correctly identified as poor but do not receive any transfer. 
The leakage of the transfer policy is the sum of the transfers given to those whose pre-
transfer income is above the poverty line and the transfers received by pre-transfer poor while 
unnecessary as the post-transfer incomes are above the poverty line. So, the leakage includes 
the  wasted  transfer  budget  due  to  too  high  post-transfer  living  standards  for  some  poor 
households. The leakage ratio is the ratio of the leakage by the transfer budget.
4 The leakage 
ratio has been estimated by Grosh and Baker (1995) and Cornia and Stewart (1995).
5  
One issue is: should one minimize poverty or undercoverage? A simple answer to this 
question is that rather than excluding one of these legitimate concerns, it would be better to 
combine them in a composite indicator that would reflect the trade-off between the two types 
of welfare risks.  This is what we do in this paper by using a C.E.S. function for the 
aggregation of indicators. We now define our new composite risk measure (CR): 
CR = ( a P0
b + (1 – a) UR
b ) 
1/b, 
where a is a positive weight representing the relative importance for the policy-maker of 
reducing poverty and undercoverage respectively.   = 1/(1 - b) is the elasticity of substitution 
of P0 and UR in the objective CR. For example, for b = 0.5, we have σ = 2. 
The C.E.S. aggregation can be seen as mixing two considerations.
6 First, parameter a 
describes the ‘relative importance or weight’ of the two welfare indicators. Second, parameter 
                                                            
4 Other indicators are possible. Creedy (1996) and Bibi and Duclos (2007) distinguish vertical inefficiency. 
Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004), Coady and Skoufias (2004), Lindert et al. (2005) and Skoufias and Coady 
(2004) use the Distribution Characteristic Indicator, which shows the change in social welfare marginal benefit 
achieved by transferring a standardized budget to the program, and the Coady -Grosh-Hoddinott index, which 
allows the comparison of the actual performance to the outcome from neutral tar geting. Many inequality, 
concentration and progressivity indices could also be used. Finally, conditional targeting could also be studied as 
in Heinrich 92007), although the Tunisian programs are not conditional in design. 
5 Grosh and Baker (1995) and Cornia and Stewart (1995) omit the second component of the leakage cost. 
6  Note that the  aggregation  corresponds to constant returns to scales. Indeed, there is  little motivation for 
introducing non-constant returns, as is obvious in the case where UR is zero.  In that case, non-constant returns 




b  describes  risk  aversion  and  substitution  features.  If  one  considers  a  decision  maker 
alternating, depending on decision times for example, between concerns for poverty and for 
exclusion of the poor, then CR
b is akin to the expectation of a utility function u(x) = x
b with 
probability a and 1-a of the two states. In that case, risk aversion situations would correspond 
to b < 1, which we assume. As above-mentioned with the definition of σ, values of parameter 
b  different  from  1  also  express  the  imperfect  substitutability  between  the  two  welfare 
indicators in the formula of CR. Thus, parameter b has a dual interpretation in terms of risk 
aversion or substitutability.
7 
All the welfare statistics we use can be decomposed into population totals, each of 
which can be consistently estimated by totals weighed by the sampling scheme of the survey. 
We now present our estimation results for Tunisia. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1. The data 
 
The  data  we  use  is  taken  from  the  1990  Tunisian  national  consumption  survey 
conducted by the INS (National Statistical Institute of Tunisia).  Using this information we 
computed the value of total consumption for a sample of 7734 households.  
Clearly,  the  definition  of  the  living  standards  matters.  Since  equivalence  scale 
specification is always debatable,
8 and we do not know  what the appropriate scale is, we 
define our welfare indicator for each household member as the total consumption expenditure 
per capita. It has been found that it is important to account for spatial price differences across 
households  for  poverty measurement  (Muller, 2002, 2008). We  correct for  spatial price 
                                                            
7 Converting the criterion by using favourable outcomes such as 1-P0 and 1-UR yields the familiar interpretation 
of  an  utility  function  based  on  ‘goods’,  and  preserves  the  substitutability,  risk  aversion  and  weighing 
interpretation of parameters. 




differences and account for substitution effects caused by price subsidies by calculating the 
equivalent-transfer corresponding to the subsidies. The calculus of the equivalent-transfer is 
explained in Muller and Bibi (2008) and is derived from the estimation of a Quadratic Almost 
Ideal Demand system.  
As mentioned above, proxy-means tests are based on predictions of household living 
standards,  obtained  from  regressions  on  observed  characteristics.  The  predictions  are,  as 
usual, calculated from ordinary least-squares estimates (OLS). The targeting scheme for cash 
transfers is estimated in two stages. We first estimate a demand system. From this estimation, 
we  derive  the  per  capita  household  equivalent-incomes,  which  are  our  living  standard 
variables. Second, we regress the logarithms of the household living standards on observable 
correlates. From these estimates we derive the predictions of living standards from observed 
household characteristics. The calculus of the optimal transfers is done using the method of 
Bourguignon and Fields (1990, 1997) applied to the sample of equivalent-incomes. All these 
calculations are detailed in Muller and Bibi (2008). 
The poverty line we use is equal to TD 250 under subsidies (The World Bank, 1995). 
It corresponds to 14.1 percent of poor people in Tunisia in 1990. This poverty line can be 
converted into an equivalent poverty line of TD 280 without in force subsidies.  
 
4.4. The estimation results 
 
We  consider  four  alternative  policies:  the  price  subsidies  and  three  cash  transfer 
schemes based on proxy-means with three respective sets of observable correlates. Muller and 
Bibi (2008) discuss in details the correlates used for the living standard predictions. We group 
these  correlates  of  living  standards  according  to  increasing  observation  difficulty  by  the 




includes  the  regional  dummies,  which  corresponds  to  regional  targeting.
9  Set II contains 
regional and demographic information on households, and characteristics of the household’s 
dwelling. The variables in Set II are unlikely to be manipulated by households and can be 
easily observed. Set III adds information on the occupation and education of the household’s 
head,  which  is  easier  to  conceal  by  households  than  other  observed  characteristics.  The 
performances of these policies are compared by using the post-policy equivalent-incomes.  
Table  1  shows  the  estimation  results  for  our  different  criteria:
10  (1)  the levels of 
poverty measures for P 0, P1 and P2; (2) two measures of targeting accuracy (leakage and 
undercoverage, (3) our new composite risk measure, for different values of parameters a (= 
0.25, 0.5 and 0.75), and b  (=  0.5, 0.75, 1,  ). The limit  case b =    corresponds to  the 
minimum of the two welfare criteria. 
Poverty levels reached by using any tried transfer method are much lower than those 
obtained with the price subsidies, for the same global budget. Moreover, the leakage statistics 
is always substantially larger with the subsidies where the only targeting device is the choice 
of the poor households to consume relatively more of the subsidized goods. Thus, direct cash 
transfers, according to these important social welfare indicators, appear are clearly preferable 
in terms of poverty. 
In contrast, the undercoverage is null for subsidies that reach everybody. With the 
transfers they amount to slightly less than one quarter of the poor, down to 18 percent with the 
best method. One question is whether the undercoverage shortcoming of the transfers can be 
enough to change the policy decision in favor of the subsidies. The answer is given by the 
estimated levels of our composite risk indicators for different values of parameters a and b. 
                                                            
9About regional targeting, see Kanbur (1987), Ravallion (1992), Datt and Ravallion (1993), Baker  and Grosh 
(1994), Besley and Kanbur (1988), Bigman and Fofack (2000) and Bigman and Srinivasan (2002). 
10 The estimates of P0 and P1 have been dropped from Muller and Bibi (2008). Therefore, the estimates for P0 




When the weights given to head-count index and undercoverage are the same (a = 
0.5), the subsidies much dominate the transfer programs, for all reasonable values of the 
substitutability parameter b. Of course, this trend is reinforced when putting more weight on 
undercoverage (a = 0.25). However, when more weight is put on the number of the poor (a = 
0.75), perhaps a reasonable approach when dealing with poverty alleviation policies, direct 
transfers  may  be  deemed  preferable  to  subsidies,  provided  their  targeting  power  is  good 
enough, for example because a large number of living standard correlates has been used. 
  The  results  show  how  policy  decisions  depend  on  balancing  weight  parameters 
between poverty and program exclusion risk. In the Tunisian case, only a much larger weight 
put on poverty relatively to exclusion, and the good targeting performance of proxy-means 
transfers, could bring the decision maker to substitute the in force price subsidies with direct 






In this paper, we draw some lessons from the Tunisian experience of social reforms 
and associated civil conflict. Our main interest is the riots that occurred after subsidy cuts and 
the substitution of price subsidies by direct cash transfers. We propose new composite welfare 
indicators apt to assess policy reforms in such situations. The indicators account for the trade 
off between poverty alleviation and targeting efficiency. Finally, using micro level data we 
show that the plausible policy decision depend on parameters describing the balance between 
poverty and program exclusion risk. In the Tunisian case, only a much larger weight put on 




subsidies with direct cash transfers, for fear of social unrest. We deem it unlikely in the short 
term. 
Our approach has been to propose new indicators of targeting risk combining social 
and political objectives. Such indicators would provide valuable information on the feasibility 
of the reform and of the likelihood of social reforms. Our composite risk indicator could for 
example be used to assess other policies as the ones discussed in Section 2 or the ones studied 
in Van de Walle (1998) for public services. 
To make it practicable, the transfer scheme in operations in Tunisia would need to be 
much extended and improved. One avenue of improvement could be to use ‘focused transfers’ 
as in Muller and Bibi (2008), based on quantile regressions. This would allow the government 
to reduce the undercoverage of the scheme to a very low level. Then, the reform should be 
politically viable because it would not generate severe risks for the large majority of the poor. 
Some of the budget allocated to price subsidies could be affected to an improved cash transfer 
program, showing to the population how the new approach reduces poverty and limit post-
program exclusion. Perhaps, the best program is to be searched as a sharing rule of the social 
budget between food subsidies and cash transfers. 
Of  course,  replacing  price  subsidies  with  cash  transfers  would  not  only  alleviate 
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Appendix 1: Estimation Results 
Table 1: Estimated Criteria 
 
  Subsidies  Transfers I  Transfers II  Transfers III 
Traditional 
indicators 
       
P0  13.86         
(0.75)        
10.50  
(0.67)               
7.52         
(0.47)      
6.79         
(0.40)      
P1  3.44       
(0.24)      
2.24        
(0.21)      
1.37        
(0.12)      
1.22        
(0.10)      
P2  1.30         
(0.11)        
0.74         
(0.10)        
0.40         
(0.05)        
0.36      
(0.04)           
Leakage  90.05           
(1.24)          
80.74         
(4.34)        
73.57         
(3.67)        
72.39     
(3.60)            










       
a = 0.5, b = 1  6.93  17.62  13.53  12.15 
a = 0.5, b = 0.5  3.46  16.86  12.82  11.52 
a = 0.5, b = 0.75  8.07  32.72  23,54  20,63 
Min(P0, UC)  0,0  10,5  7,52  6,79 
         
a = 0.25, b = 1  3,47  21,17  16,54  14,82 
a = 0.25, b = 0.5  0,86  20,61  16,00  14,35 
a = 0.25, b = 0.75  2,60  41,42  30,50  26,68 
         
a = 0.75, b = 1  10,4  14,06  10,53  9,47 
a = 0.75, b = 0.5  7,79  13,49  9,99  9,00 
a = 0.75, b = 0.75  15,65  24,83  17,30  15,21 
 
Sampling standard errors are in parentheses. There are 7734 observations. 
 
The rows of P2, UR and Leakage are taken from Muller and Bibi (2008). The estimates of P0, P1 and those of our 
composite risk measures are new. 
 
Set I of independent variables includes only regional variables. Set II includes in addition to Set I, demographic 
and dwelling variables. Set III includes in addition to Set II, occupation and schooling level of household head. 
 
Each of the measures presented in this table has been multiplied by 100 for easy interpretation.  
 